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ONLINE BANDWIDTH AUCTIONS
FOR EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF
BANDWIDTH
Y.P. Que and D. Platt
University of Wollongong
Wollongong, NSW, 2522, Australia
Abstract - This paper describes an on-line auction
process for dynamic bandwidth allocation in
communication networks. The auction is intended
to be repeated at short (perhaps ten minute)
intervals. The outcome of the auction gives both the
bandwidth allocation, and the price to he paid for
it. The network is assumed to be MPLS capable,
and two variations are provided, one in which a
single LSP is available between each
sourceldestination pair, and another in which
multiple LSPs are available. We show that the
present algorithms are scalable up to about 150
nodes.

auction mechanism. However, their method
appears to be overly computationally intensive,
and they offer results only for an auction over a
single link
What we present here is a bandwidth allocation
scheme, which uses the actual rates paid for each
route. We will offer results over networks up to
hundreds of nodes. An ISP, which is prepared to
pay more for a block of bandwidth, will get that
bandwidth. The network provider will get the
maximum income available from selling the
resources.

1. INTRODUCTION
In a public auction, the participants make their
bids for an item, and they are also able to see
what others are willing to pay for the same item.
It is the intention of this paper to offer a similar
method. The auction would be carried out
automatically, and would be repeated at short
intervals, say every ten minutes. After the
auction has been completed, the bidders are
guaranteed the bandwidth they are awarded, at
the finishing price of the auction over the
following ten minutes. We suggest that this is a
short enough period for bandwidth demand to be
tracked closely. They are also committed to
paying for that bandwidth at the price which
finished the auction.

Network providers sell bandwidth to lSPs or
large companies between defined points within
their network. When the demand for bandwidth
is less than what is available, the ISPs simply
pay the standard price. However, when the
bandwidth demand is greater than what is
available, the problem of bandwidth allocation
arises. This problem, in one form or another, has
been known for a number of years.
The attraction of using a pricing mechanism has
been recognized by a number of researchers. In
reference [I], the authors introduce a pricing
scheme which rewards users who take less
bandwidth than what has been allocated to their
access pipe. In [2], the authors use a game
theoretic approach to the allocation of bandwidth
for elastic services in high-speed networks.

2. MODEL OF SIMPLE AUCTION
Let us suppose that we are to auction the
bandwidth across a single link. The total
bandwidth available is fixed, but the bidders
(ISPs) together ask for more than this. The
auction would proceed with the auctioneer
suggesting a price, and each bidder stating how
much bandwidth they are willing to buy at that
price. Presumably, as the price increases, the
amount of bandwidth that each bidder will buy,
must decrease. Thus, as the auction proceeds, the
price increases, and the total amount of

A system of dynamic bandwidth allocation is
introduced in [3], however, the paper does not
address the issue of the allocation of bandwidth
when the users require more bandwidth than is
available. Reference [4] does not actually price
the bandwidth, however it does address the issue
of dynamic bandwidth allocation.
Takahashi and Tanaka [S, 61 are the closest to an
on-line dynamic bandwidth allocation using an
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bandwidth required decreases. Eventually, it will
decrease to an amount just equal to the available
bandwidth, and the auction stops at that point.
Every bidder is awarded the amount of
bandwidth for which they bid, at the final price.

known to them all. The first option would make
collusion among the ISPs difficult or impossible.
The second option would allow them to check
that all were treated equally.

2.1 MPLS Enabled Network
As it has been described above, the auction is an
iterated process, but it could be condensed to a
single step if the bidders entered a graph of the
bandwidth they would buy at the price they
would pay. Figure 1 shows such a graph.
bandwidth

price

Figure 1. Bandwidth vs Price for One Bidder
The graph must have a zero or negative slope at
all points. Other bidders would have similar
graphs, and we show in Figure 2 the graphs for
three bidders. The auction process reaches the
point “A” on the graph, where the bandwidths all
add to exactly equal the available bandwidth.

hot.

bandw’ th

We will deal with an IP network, enabled for
MPLS. Each ISP will require bandwidth between
a number of nodes within the network.
Congestion in the network must be controlled by
the use of appropriate label switched paths
(LSPs), and we will consider two ways of doing
this in this paper. The first method consists in
establishing a single LSP between every
sourceidestination (sid) pair of nodes. If parts of
the network become congested, we can ease the
congestion by setting up a different LSP for
selected sid pairs. We leave it to other functions
of network management to achieve this. For this
paper, it means that there is only one LSP
between sid pairs, and therefore only one LSP to
be the subject of an auction. Of course, the
auction of one LSP affects the bandwidth
available to other LSPs.
Another method to deal with congestion in parts
of a network is to allocate several LSPs
permanently to each sid pair. Then a LSP which
passes through a congested part of the network is
likely to receive relatively little of the total
bandwidth allocated to the sid pair. Most of the
bandwidth would go to the LSPs which do not
pass through heavily congested areas. This
method makes the management of LSPs less of a
problem, but increases the complexity of the
auction algorithm.

2.2 Method I -Single LSP

final price

Figure 2. Auction for a Single Link
This requires each bidder to disclose, at least to
the auctioneer, the bandwidth it would have bid
for prices higher than the finishing price (ruling
price). The auctioneer would only report to the
bidders the finishing price, and the bandwidth
they have been allocated. There is an issue
around the confidentiality of each bidder’s graph.
It may be that the bidders are content to simply
learn their own result, or they may prefer that the
bandwidth allocated to all bidders be made

An algorithm must take as its inputs the topology
of the network, the available bandwidth in each
link, and the bids of each ISP for each sid pair.
Each bid must be of the form shown in Figure I,
that is, non-increasing, and touching each axis.
The first step is to aggregate all the bids from the
ISPs for each LSP, as shown in the example of
Figure 2. This gives us a combined bid for the
LSP concemed.
These combined bids must ‘then compete with
the bids for other LSPs for the bandwidth in the
links they use. The next step is lo look at each
link individually, and combine the bids of all
LSPs using that link. We then find the ruling
price for each link, in the same way as is

for varying numbers of nodes, N. The complete
test of network generation and auction algorithm
was run five times for each value of N.

illustrated in Figure 2. The algorithm proceeds as
below.
1. For each LSP, aggregate bandwidth fiom all
bids. This will produce a curve such as the one in
Figure 2. Create a list of all LSPs available for
bidding.
2. Aggregate the bandwidth for each link, from
the curves for each LSP using the link (similar to
Figure 2). Find the ruling price for each link.
This is the price where the aggregate curve for
the link crosses the available bandwidth in that
link.
3. Select the link with the highest ruling price.
4. Set this price for all LSPs using this link, and
for all ISP bids for these LSPs. Allocate the
corresponding bandwidth to these LSPs and

Two different scenarios were tested, neither of
which could be satisfied by simply allocating the
floor price. In one scenario, the demand was high
for all sid pairs, but uniform. In the other, the
demand for 30% of the sid pairs was
significantly higher than for the rest.

To compare the effectiveness of each method,
the total amount of revenue accepted was
computed for similar network situations.
The average run time of the algorithm was
recorded.

ISPS.

5. Reduce the available bandwidth on all links
used by these LSPs by the amounts determined
in step 4, above, and remove these LSPs from
the list.
6. If all LSPs have been removed from the list,
stop. Otherwise, return to step 2.

4

Results

Figures 3 and 4 show the ruling prices at the end
of the auction process for a network with 20
nodes, using the single LSP system. The sid pairs
are graphed in the order in which the ruling
prices were determined, which is why the prices
decrease uniformly. In the case of the bids being
even, shown in Figure 3, the bulk of the prices
are close to the highest price. The last few sid
pairs determined did not need to go through the
auction process, and the floor price was used. On
the other hand, Figure 4 shows the results for
uneven bids, and the first prices determined are
considerably above the prices achieved for the
bulk of s/d pairs. These results are as one would
expect, and the result is similar for the multiple

2.3 Method 2 - Multiple LSPs
When multiple LSPs are used, the algorithm is
more complicated. It turns out to he easier if we
approach the problem starting from the highest
prices, and work down, until all possible links
are fully utilized. We also allocate the bandwidth
to each LSP in such a way that the bandwidth
still left available is the same in each of those
LSPs. This mechanism ensures that traffic is
directed away from those parts of the network
where the traffic would be heaviest.

3 Test Procedures
A series of networks was generated, in software,
using a random network generator. The multiLSP system was run with three parallel paths. In
order to give the multi-LSP system a chance to
show its potential, the average number of links
connecting each node was about five. The
bandwidth of each link was set at IO Gbps. LSPs
were generated using Dijkstra’s algorithm. As far
as possible, the LSPs between a sid pair were
constrained not to use the same links. The
collective action of the ISPs was simulated by
producing a bandwidthiprice curve for each sid
pair. This would represent the total handwidth
from all the lSPs at each price. That is, an
aggregate curve is used for each sid pair. The
tests were carried out for both algorithms, and
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Figure 3. Ruling price for even bids, single LSP
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Figure 5 shows the revenue generated by both
systems on different sized networks. At all points
except N=10, the single LSP system generates
more income. This is perhaps a surprising result,
since the multi-LSP system seems to offer
significantly more flexibility. When the bidding
pattem was uneven, it would be the most likely
that the multi-LSP system would have the best
chance of producing the highest revenue. The
results, shown in Figure 6, do not support this for

This can be explained by the average number of
links used in the LSPs when parallel paths have

The single LSP always uses the least number of
links. Mostly, parallel paths need more links, so
the multi-LSP system fills up the network
capacity more quickly as the auction progresses.
The single LSP system, being simpler, would be
expected to take less time to execute. The
comparison is shown in Figure 8, in both cases,
the program being run on a 2.7 GHz Pentium 4
processor. The graph for the single LSP case is
extended beyond a 50 node network in Figure 9,
which shows that for N = 316, the average
execution time increases to 3x10' seconds, or
500 minutes. When N = 150, the execution time
is about ten minutes.

633

Two methods, involving a single LSP between
two points, and multiple LSPs were investigated.
The single LSP system performed somewhat
better than the multi-LSP method on several
measures, not least of which was program
execution time.

If bandwidth is auctioned between all pairs of
nodes, the execution time for the single LSP
system takes about ten minutes when the
network has 150 nodes. If this is to be used as a
real time system, this is about as far as the
present system can be taken. For networks up to
this size, this is a system which is responsive to
commercial reality, and guarantees the highest
revenue to the network provider.

6 References

Figure 8. Execution times

[ I ] Costas Courcoubetist and Vasilios A. Siris, “An
Evaluation of Pricing Schemes that are based on
Effective Usage”, 1998 IEEE International
Conference on Communications (ICC 1998).
Vol.l,pp. 265-269, 7-11 June 1998.
[Z] Haikel Yahhe, Tavi R. Mazumdar, Catherine
Rosenberg, “A Game Theoretic Framework for
Bandwidth Allocation and Pricing in Broadband
Networks”, IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
NETWORKING, Vo1.8, No.5, 667-678, Oct.
2000.
[3] Adel S . Elmaghraby, Anup Kumar, Mehmed M

Kantardzic, Mostafa Gamal Mostafa, ‘‘
Bandwidth Allocation in a Dynamic Environment
Using a Variable Pricing Policy”, In Proceedings
of the Seventh International Symposium on
Computers and Communications 2002 (ISCC
2002), pp. 589-594, 14July 2002.
[4] Ana Luiza B.P.B.DINIZ, Carlos C. GOLJLART,
Jose Marcos S. NOGUEIRA, “Dynamic

Bandwidth Allocation Service for Am-based
Networks supporting Multimedia Applications”,
1998 first IEEE International Conference on
ATM (ICATM 1998), pp. 292 -299, 22-24 h o e
1998.

5 Comments and Conclusions

[ 5 ] Eiji Takahashi, Yoshiaki Tanaka, “Auction
Method and its Performance in a Dynamic
Bandwidth Allocation Service”, 1st European
Conference on Universal Multiservice Network
(ECUMN2000). pp. 328 -334,2-4 Oct. 2000.
[6] Eiji Takahashi, Yoshiaki Tanaka, “Auction-based

This paper has proposed a novel system to
distribute bandwidth in a communications
network among organizations such as lSPs who
then on-sell it. The mechanism is based on the
traditional idea of an auction. We believe that it
offers the hest possible bandwidth allocation in
the sense that the network provider receives the
best possible price for their resources, and
bandwidth is allocated to the bidders on the basis
of the money they are prepared to pay for it.

0-7803-8783-X/04/$20.00 0 2004 IEEE

Effective Bandwidth Allocation Mechanism”,
10”’
InternationoI
Conference
on
Telecommunications 2003 (ICT 2003)). Vol. 2.
pp. 1046 1050.23 Feb. - 1 Mar. 2003.
~

634

